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APPLYING HOCHFELDER IN
COMMODITY FRAUD CASES
PHILIP F. JOHNSON *
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder 1 established that a private action for civil damages will not be al-
lowed under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 2 or under rule
I Ob-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission 3 in the absence of an alle-
gation of intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud on the part of the defend-
ant. This "scienter" requirement makes deficient any complaint under sec-
tion 10(b) or rule 10b-5 that is based strictly on a negligence theory.
The Commodity Exchange Act contains an antifraud provision, section
4b, 4 which, although not identical, has been analogized to section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act. 5 This article will examine whether the requirement
of "scienter" established by Hochfelder, is applicable to private damage actions
brought under section 4b. After a brief review of the Hochfelder decision, the
. language of section 4b will be presented along with a discussion of the federal
judicial and administrative decisions which have thus far interpreted that sec-
tion. Using the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Hochfelder, the
article will conclude that liability should not be imposed under section 4b ab-
sent a showing of scienter. This conclusion will be further supported. by refer-
ence to the various policy considerations unique to the regulation of com-
modities transactions.
I. THE HOCHFELDER DECISION
In Hochfelder, the defendant, Ernst & Ernst, audited the books of First
Securities Company of Chicago during a period when the principal owner
defrauded a number of investors.' In addition, Ernst & Ernst prepared an-
* B.A. 1959, Indiana University; LL.B. 1962 Yale Law School. Partner, Kirk-
land & Ellis, Chicago, Illinois.
1 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
2 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
3 17 C.F.R. § 240-1013-5 (1978).
7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976).
5 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n. v. J.S.
Options, Ltd., 422 F. Supp. 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
425 U.S. at. 288-89. A finding of securities fraud was
Securities in, Securities and Exchange Comun'n. v. First Securities
988 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972).
Love & Associates
made against First
Co., 463 F.2d 981,
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nual reports to the SEC and financial reports to the Midwest. Stock Exchange
on First Securities' behalf. A defrauded investor instituted suit in federal
court alleging that Ernst & Ernst would have unearthed information leading
to a discovery of the fraud but for the insufficiency of its accounting proce-
dures. Although the complaint accused Ernst & Ernst of "aiding and abetting"
the fraud, during discovery it became clear that the only real issue concerned
negligent nonfeasance by Ernst & Ernst in the conduct of its audits.' The
district court rejected Ernst & Ernst's contention that negligence alone is in-
sufficient to support a claim under section 10(b) or rule 10b-5. 8 Neverthe-
less, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Ernst & Ernst, finding
that Ernst & Ernst had not been negligent. since it had adhered to generally
accepted accounting procedures in its audits of First Securities.
On appeal, the United States Court. of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed and remanded, holding that one who breaches a duty of inquiry and
disclosure owed another is liable in damages for aiding and abetting a third
party's violation of rule 10b-5 if the fraud would have been discovered or
prevented but for the breach," The "duty", according to the court, emanates
from two sources: (1) a common law duty of inquiry arising from Ernst. &
Ernst's contract to audit First Securities; and (2) a statutory duty of inquiry
under section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and its corollary, SEC rule
17a-5, as preparer of First Securities' annual financial report to the SEC. The
court of appeals further held that the defrauded investors of First Securities
were within the class of persons intended to be protected by section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5, so that they could maintain their action."
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's decision holding that
proof of "scienter"—an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud—is neces-
sary to sustain a claim under section 10(b) or rule 10b-5." Thus even if
public accounting firms owe a "duty of inquiry" and Ernst & Ernst had been
negligent in fulfilling this duty, the complaint was still insufficient under sec-
tion 10(b) and rule 10b-5 because Ernst & Ernst had no intent to defraud.
The "starting point" in the Supreme Court's construction of section 10(b) was
an analysis of the statutory language.' 2 Section 10(b) makes it unlawful to
"use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe ...." The
Hochfelder Court had no difficulty concluding that phrases such as "manipula-
tive or deceptive" and "devices or contrivances" import more than mere ne-
glect and connote the presence of knowing or intentional misconduct.' 3 In
the Court's view; these are "terms that make unmistakable a congressional
7 425 U.S. at 289-91.
Id. at 191.
" Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1104 (7th Cir. 1974).
'" Id. at 1117.
" 425 U.S. at 199-201. The Court declined to rule on the question of section
10(b) liability for aiding and abetting. Id. at 192 n.7.
' 2
 Id. at 197.
1 1 Id.
May 19791	 COMMODITY FRAUD CASES 	 635
intent to proscribe a type of conduct quite different from negligence." 14 The
Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument that suits under section 10(b)
or rule 10b-5 are appropriate to redress negligent conduct in order to ac-
complish the Act's "remedial purposes." 15 Furthermore, the Court attached
no weight to portions of rule 10b-5 proscribing material misstatements or
omissions since rule 10b-5 was promulgated pursuant to section 10(h) and
must therefore be read to require scienter."
Prefacing further inquiry with the statement that it may have been un-
necessary,' 7 in light of section 10(b)'s plain language requiring scienter, the
Hochfelder Court nevertheless proceeded to examine the legislative history of
section 10(b). Although the Court cited a few supportive passages from tes-
timony and reports, it found the legislative history of the 1934 Act "bereft of
any explicit explanation of Congress' intent," with regard to the appropriate
standard of liability. The Court also examined the "interdependence" between
the various sections of the Securities Act in ascertaining congressional in-
tent.'" The Court noted that wherever Congress created express private
rights of action in the 1934 Act, the sections clearly specified whether recov-
ery was to be premised on knowing or intentional conduct, negligence, or
entirely innocent mistake.'" Moreover, in every section of the Act where neg-
ligence alone was made sufficient for a violation, Congress added special pro-
cedural restrictions not applicable under section 10(b)." 11 liability under
section 10(b) were to be premised on mere negligence, the Supreme Court
reasoned, causes of action intended to be brought under the carefully drawn
procedural restrictions of other sections could be brought instead under sec-
tion 10(b), thus frustrating congressional intent. 2 '
14 Id. at 199.
15 hi. at 200.
15 hi. at 212-13.
17 Id. at 201.
18 Id. at 204-06.
19 Id. at 207.
2° Id. at 210.
21 Id. at 210-11. Apart from the specific facts of Hochfeider, certain general
characteristics of the controversy deserve isolation. First, the plaintiffs had to rely upon
a judicially implied private right of action because § 10(b) does not contain express
authority for private actions. Id. at 196. Nothing in the Supreme Court's opinion, how-
ever, suggests that a different interpretation would have been forthcoming if an ex-
press private remedy were contained in § 10(b). Second, the remedy sought was dam-
ages rather than prospective injunctive relief. The Supreme Court specifically refused
to decide whether scienter is required in § 10(b) cases seeking injunctive relief, Id. at
199 n.12, although the dissent of Justices Blackmun and Brennan reached the sensible
conclusion that the type of relief sought should not affect the determination of
whether a violation of § 10(b) or rule 10b-5 has occurred. Id. at 217-18. Third, the
action was initiated by private parties rather than by the SEC. Once again, however,
the identity of the complainant should have no effect upon whether § 10(b) or rule
101)-5 has been breached. Id. Fourth, the defendant in the case was not cited as a
perpetrator of the fraud but, rather, was accused merely of neglecting to unearth the
true culprit through its audits. According to the Supreme Court, the same
requirement—scienter—must be shown in suits of this nature as in actions against the
actual perpetrator. Fifth, it is insufficient under § 10(b) merely to prove that a "duty"
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In summary, the Hochfelder Court relied primarily on the statutory lan-
guage in determining that scienter is required under section 10(b), and but-
tressed that conclusion by examining the legislative history of the 1934 Act.
The next section of this article will attempt to apply the Hochfelder analysis to
section 4b of the Commodity Exchange Act.
II. APPLYING HOCHFELDER TO COMMODITIES FRAUD
Using the approach set forth in Hochfelder, the "starting point" in deter-
mining whether scienter is necessary to prove commodities fraud is the lan-
guage of section 4b of the Commodity Exchange Act. Since extensive refer-
ence will be made to the language of section 4b throughout the article, it is set
forth in full below:
It shall be unlawful (1) for any member of a contract market, or
for any correspondent, agent, or employee of any member, in or in
connection with an order to make, or the making of any contract of
sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, made, or to be made,
on or subject to the rules of any contract market, for or on behalf of
any other person, or (2) for any person, in or in connection with any
order to make, or the making of, any contract of sale of any com-
modity for future delivery, made, or to be made, on or subject to the
rules of any contract market, for or on behalf of any other person if
such contract for future delivery is or may be used for (a) hedging
was breached that frustrated detection or correction of the fraud, even if that duty
arises under the same federal statute that prohibits the underlying fraud. And, finally,
negligent performance of a statutory or common law duty is not "aiding and abetting"
a § 10(b) violation. Indeed, the Supreme Court has cast substantial doubt on whether
"aiding and abetting" will hereafter exist at all as a claim under § 10(b) or rule 10b-5
unless scienter by the airier or abettor—"a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud"—is also shown. See note 8 supra.
22
 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976). An exception to subsection (D) appears at the end of
section 4b, authorizing the "crossing' or "matching" of orders hekl by a futures com-
mission merchant or floor broker for execution at the prevailing market price under
certain restrictions.
Certain features of § 4b deserve careful examination. First, and perhaps most
important, § 4h deals only with conduct of an agent in the performance of services for
a principal. It applies primarily to futures commission merchants (and their salesmen)
or floor brokers in the solicitation, handling or execution of commodities transactions
for customers or investors. It does not encompass a fraud committed between two
agents or between two principals, nor does it cover a fraud perpetrated by an agent
against someone else's principal. The wrongdoing must be that of the agent and it
must be against the person on whose behalf the agent is acting, namely, the agent's
own principal.
Second, § 4b differentiates between cash or "spot" commodity transactions made
on a contract market and futures contracts made there. Subsection (I), which relates to
dealings in actual commodities on a contract market, prohibits fraud only if it is com-
mitted by a "member of a contract market, or ... any correspondent, agent, or
employee of any member" and, as is true throughout § 4b, only if the fraud is commit-
ted by the member against someone for whom he is acting. Subsection (2), which
speaks of futures contracts made on a contract market, applies by its terms to "any
person" who is agent for a principal in such transactions.
May 1979]
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any transaction in interstate commerce in such commodity or the
products or byproducts thereof, or (b) determining the price basis of
any transaction in interstate commerce in such commodity, or (c) de-
livering any such commodity sold, shipped, or received in interstate
commerce for the fulfillment thereof—
(A) to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud such
other person;
(B) willfully to make or cause to be made to such other per-
son any false report or statement thereof; or willfully to enter or
cause to be entered for such person any false record thereof;
(C) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive such other per-
son by any means whatsoever in regard to any such order or
contract or the disposition or execution of any such order or
contract, or in regard to any act of agency performed with re-
spect to such order or contract for such person; or
(D) to bucket such order, or to fill such order by offset
against the order or orders of any other person, or willfully and
knowingly and without the prior consent of such person to be-
come the buyer in respect to any selling order of such person,
or become the seller in respect to any buying order of such per-
son. 22
Given the language of section 4b, it must be determined whether that lan-
guage requires proof of scienter to establish a violation of its terms. Before
taking the first step in the Hochfelder analysis, however, it is helpful to review
prior judicial and administrative interpretations of section 4b and to consider
the position of Commodity Futures Trading Commission on the proper stan-
dard of liability.
A. Prior Judicial and Administrative Decisions
Four years before Hochfelder, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana determined that section 4b requires proof of
more than negligence to establish a violation. In McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer &
Co., 23 a Kohlmeyer salesman bought cotton futures contracts at a price ex-
ceeding his customer's instructions, in the mistaken belief that the customer
wished to enter the market even if a higher price had to be paid. Thereafter,
the salesman misinformed the customer of his rights, not knowing that the
customer could rescind the transaction. The customer brought suit under sec-
tion 4b to recover his losses on the cotton futures transactions, even though
the salesman "had not intention to mislead, cheat or defraud" the customer. 24
The district court, focusing on the language of section 4b, held that simple
negligence is not a violation:
The C.E.A. [Commodity Exchange Act] does not use sweeping
terms. Its pejoratives are simple and pointed: it uses the words
"cheat" and "defraud" and "wilfully." By any definition these con-
note deliberate acts or a degree of negligence that is so gross as to
23 347 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. La. 1972). aff'd, 477 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1973).
24 347 F. Supp. at 575.
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approach wilfulness. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact
that criminal penalties are attached to a violation of section 6b, 7
U.S.C. § 13. Such penalties are not usually attached to good faith
actions merely because they are negligent or uninformed. Nor did
Congress in the C.E.A. employ any general prohibitions against un-
true statements of material fact or omissions to state material facts
such as those found in the Securities Act of 1933. 25
The district court in McCurnin found that the Commodity Exchange Act's
anti-fraud provision—section 4b—is much narrower in its scope than section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC rule 10b-5. The court noted
that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 "employs much broader language"
and that there "is no counterpart of Section10(b) in the C.E.A., nor any coun-
terpart of Rule 10-b-5 in the Commodities Act regulations." 26 Furthermore,
the district court described the customer's attempt to expand section 4b's
scope as "chopping it into fine pieces as part of a stew composed of mingled
bits of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934," and
other securities statutes. 27
More recently, in Silverman v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission," the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was confronted with
the issue whether the term wilfully in section 4b requires proof of evil motive.
The court held that section 4b does not require proof of evil motive, but it is
important to note that the facts showed "a pattern and program of
[unauthorized] trading in large measure carried on over a period of years
with many people in an intentional and calculated manner .... 29 Thus, the of-
fense clearly involved intentional violations of known duties.
In a second recent case, Haltmier v. Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion, 3 ° the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reaffirmed
that evil motive is not a necessary element of a section 4b fraud. Nevertheless,
the court found deliberate and intentional mishandling of a commodity cus-
tomer's account:
Nor is it important that Haltmier may not have had an evil mo-
tive or an affirmative intent to injure his customer, or that he did
not subjectively want to cheat or defraud Millet. It is enough that he
acted deliberately, knowing that his acts were unauthorized and con-
trary to instructions. Such knowing, intentional conduct made his
acts wilful, and therefore his violations of the statutory prohibition
against cheating or defrauding the customer were wilful, in the ac-
cepted sense for infractions of this type. 3 '
25 Id. at 576.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 575. See also, Economou v. U.S. Depariment of Agriculture, 494 F.2d
519 (2d Cir. 1974).
28 549 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977).
29 Id. at 31 (emphasis in original).
3° 554 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1977).
31 Id. at 562.
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Moreover, the court in Haltmier found that "[t]here is now no doubt" that
unauthorized trading is a section 4b violation, 32 thus inferring that the
petitioner would have had no reason to believe in good faith that his inten-
tional, deliberate conduct was lawful or proper.
The Silverman and Haltmier decisions seem to articulate a standard of
proof for section 4b fraud that is at variance with the Hochfelder scienter re-
quirement. Those decisions specifically reject the concept that the conduct in
question must include an "evil motive" or even a subjective desire to cheat,
defraud or injure the commodity customer. In contrast, Hochfelder requires "a
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud" 33
 before a
violation is proven under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 'Act.
Whether an actual conflict of standards exists, however, cannot be determined
with certainty for several reasons. First, neither Silverman nor Haltmier ex-
pressly considered the Hochfelder precedent, so they cannot be said to have
consciously rejected its scienter requirement. Second, the conduct in both Sil-
verman and Haltmier was held to be knowing, deliberate and intentional, so
that a finding of the "mental state" required by Hochfelder may be implicit in
those decisions. And, third, it is clear in both Silverman and Haltmier that mere
negligence was not present, and the decisions do not purport to decide that
such negligence would be "fraud" under section 4b.
In contrast to the federal court's interpretation of section 4b, the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission has expressed the view that fraud under
section 4b should be construed broadly. On June 24, 1975—prior to the
Hochfelder ruling—a CFTC release in the Federal Register adopted special an-
tifraud rules 34 for commodity options, 35 leverage contracts,36 and illegal off-
exchange future transactions 37 which are patterned largely after SEC rule
10b-5 rather than section 4b. The release contained the following plea for
broad interpretation of section 4b:
The Commission notes that at least two courts may have taken a
restrictive view of the purpose of section 4b because of the require-
ment of willfulness in the statute [citing McCurnin and Economou v.
U.S. Department of Agriculture]." The Commission does not believe
these decisions should have continued vitality as applied to the Act as
recently amended. It is appropriate—particularly in light of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 39 —that all
provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, as amended, be broadly
32 Id. at 560.
33 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
34 CFTC Regs. §§ 30.01, 30.02, 30.03; 17 C.F.R. §§ 30.01, 30.02, 30.03 (1978).
35 Regulation of commodity options, including anti-fraud standards, is based
upon § 4c(b) of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6c(b) (1976).
36
 Regulation of leverage contracts, including anti-fraud standards, is based
upon § 19 of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 15a (1976).
37 Futures contract trading anywhere except through a contract market is il-
legal under § 4h of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6h, and is a felony
under § 9 of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13 (1976).
38
 494 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1974).
39 Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389, amending 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
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construed to effectuate their remedial purposes [citing authorities].
The courts have frequently held in the context of remedial legisla-
tion that willfulness connotes no more than an awareness of an act
or omission and not whether the act or omission is understood to be
unlawful [citing cases]."
The reasons cited by the Commission for broadly construing section 4b do not
fully support its position. The significance of the reference to the CFTC Act
of 1974 is unclear in view of the fact that section 4b was left untouched by
those amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act, even though Congress
was urged in 1974 to broaden the scope of section 413.4 ' The Commission's
other rationale—to "effectuate the remedial purposes" of the Commodity Ex-
change Act—was held in Hochfelder to be insufficient reason to disregard the
plain language or legislative history of a statutory provision. 42
The Commission's leaning toward equating section 4b fraud with negli-
gence has been manifested in reparations cases brought by complaining inves-
tors against Act registrants under section 14 of the Commodity Exchange
Act. 43 Added by the CFTC Act of 1974, section 14 allows complainants to
institute proceedings before the Commission itself for damages against per-
sons required to be registered under the Act, and the Commission may award
damages if it is proven that the respondent has violated the Act or any regula-
tion or order thereunder. These cases are heard initially by an administrative
lawjudge, and that decision is reviewable by the full Commission and, there-
after, by a United States Court of Appeals. To date, administrative law judges
have sometimes ruled that a section 4b violation can be shown in reparations
cases by evidence that the respondent was negligent in the performance of a
"fiduciary duty" toward the complainant. None of these initial decisions, how-
ever, has yet been reviewed by the full Commission.
The principal reparations case equating section 4b fraud and negligence
is Gordon v. Shearson Hayden Stone, /am." There, the respondents had per-
suaded the complainant to engage in a "spread" transaction that incurred sub-
stantial losses. The administrative law judge held, first, that "a broker/agent
has, by definition, a fiduciary relationship to his customer" 45 and that "acts in
violation of the fiduciary duties of an agent are regarded as fraudulent, and
hence violative of Section 4b." 46 Turning to the facts, the judge concluded
that the spread transaction was not "unsuited" to the complainant, an experi-
enced and affluent businesswoman, and that no misrepresentations had been
made to her. However, the judge found that the complainant had not been
fully informed of the risks of commodity trading as a result of respondent's
4° 40 Fed. Reg. 26504, 26505 n.2 (June 24, 1975).
41 Hearings on H.R. 13113 et al., before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and
Forestry, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 716, 729 (May 22, 1974) (testimony of Prof. Jerome P.
Weiss).
42 425 U.S. at 199 & n.19, 200.
43 7 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
44 2 CCH Comm. Fut. L. Reg. 20,427 (June 14, 1977).
45 Id. at 11 21,731.
4° Id.
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mistaken belief that the spread transaction did not create high risk. The re-
spondent contended that his omission was innocent and lacked the intent to
defraud that is required by the Hochfelder and McCurnin decisions. The judge
rejected that argument on the ground that McCurnin has been "undermined"
by later decisions, including Haltmier and Silverman. As noted earlier, however,
neither Haltmier nor Silverman involved purely negligent conduct, and neither
ruled that negligence alone constitutes section 4b fraud. The judge also relied
upon Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. J.S. Love & Associates Options,
Ltd. 47 In J.S. Love the district court denied defendants' motion for summary
judgment holding that a violation of the CFTC anti-fraud rule could be estab-
lished absent evidence of willful misconduct." The court also held that, on
the facts, a preliminary injunction was not warranted. 49 The decision in J.S.
Love however, did not involve section 4b but rather the special language of
CFTC regulation 30.01, prohibiting fraud in options, that is far broader than
section 4b. 5 °
In the Gordon reparations proceeding, the respondent also urged the ad-
ministrative law judge to adopt and apply the "scienter" requirement of
Hochfelder. The judge refused to do so, noting that section 4b does not contain
the same words as section 10(b), that breach of a fiduciary duty may constitute
"a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability" under sec-
tion 4b even if it would be insufficient under section 10(b), and that a "will-
ful" standard—even if appropriate where civil damage remedies are judicially
implied—is not necessary when an express right to damages (as provided by
section 14) exists under the Act.'' A strong argument can be made, however,
that the "cheat" and "defraud" pejorarives of section 4b and its express "will-
fulness" requirement impose a scienter requirement no less strong than sec-
tion 10(b). Moreover, the initial decision in Gordon identifies no public policy
why the negligent act of a commodities broker should constitute fraud while
the same act by a securities broker is not fraud unless scienter is proven.
In sum, no court has ruled that negligence alone constitutes section 4b
fraud. Although the CFTC and the Gordon reparations case support a broad
construction of section 4b, the next section of this article will demonstrate that
this construction contradicts the approach the Hochfelder Court used in inter-
preting section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.
B. The Hochfelder Approach
1. Statutory Language
Turning to the language of section 4b, it is necessary to examine each
subsection, (A) through (D), just as the Supreme Court in Hochfelder studied
47 422 F. Supp. 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
48 Id. at 659-60.
" Id. at 661.
5 U CFTC Reg. § 30.01, 17 C.F.R. § 30.01 (1978). For example, section 30.01
contains no "willfulness" requirement. The District Court in J.S. Love, quoting the
CFTC itself, observed that "the Commission has not used the concept of willful be-
havior [in § 20.01], which is reflected in the statutory language [of § 4b]." 422 F. Supp.
at 659.
5 2 CCH Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 1[11 20,427; 21,733-34.
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the specific words of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. In subsec-
tion (A), it is an offense for an agent to "cheat" or to "defraud" his principal,
or to attempt to do so. The common understanding 52 of these words is that
the agent's conduct is intentional and deliberate rather than inadvertent or
merely negligent. The word "cheat" is defined as "to deprive of something
valuable by the use of .deceit or fraud." 53 The term "defraud" connotes the same
meaning. 54 "To attempt" something is "to make an effort to do, accomplish,
solve or effect." 55 Nowhere in the standard reference works are those terms
equated with accidental, inadvertent, or merely negligent conduct.
Subsection (B) of section 4b prohibits an agent from making any "false
report or statement" to, or to create any "false record" for, his principal if
that conduct is "willfully" done. A "false" report, statement or record might
be inadvertently or negligently made,56 without an intent to convey false in-
formation. Subsection (B) eliminates that possible interpretation, however, by
limiting the offense to the "willful" making of a false report, statement or
record by the agent to his principal. The term "willful" means "intentional"
or "done deliberately" in common parlance. 57
The modifier "willfully" appears again in subsection (C) which makes it a
section 4b offense for the agent "to deceive or attempt to deceive" his princi-
pal "by any means whatsoever" in regard to "any act of agency" performed
for the principal involving a commodities order or contract. The term "de-
ceive" connotes a deliberate purpose to mislead," as contrasted with more
passive characterizations such as "to misinform" or "to give inaccurate infor-
mation." And, since the deception must be "willful" under subsection (C) in
order to be actionable, misinformation'conveyed by accident, inadvertence, or
mere negligence would seem to be clearly exempted from that provision.
Subsection (D) of section 4b describes practices that depart somewhat
from classic concepts of fraud but are intended to assure the open, competi-
tive execution of orders in the market. For example, subsection (D) prohibits
the "bucketing" of orders received by the agent from his principal. Bucketing
has been described in the following terms: "To bucket an order is for the
receiver of the order to cover it himself without making a contract with some-
52 In llochfelder, The Supreme Court cited standard dictionary meanings in
reaching its decision that the language of § 10(b) did not extend to merely negligent
action. 425 U.S. at 199 & 11.20.
53 WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 189 (1973) (emphasis added).
54 Id. at 298.
55 Id. at 72.
58 Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary gives as the first definition "not
genuine" while relegating to second meaning "intentionally untrue." Id. at 413. The
Random House Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language defines the term
"false" as "not true or correct, erroneous" as the primary meaning and cites "false
statement" as an example of that usage. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 513 (1966).
57 WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1341 (1973); RANDOM HOUSE UN-
ABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1634 (1966).
58 RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 374
(1966) ("To mislead by a false appearance or statement; delude").
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one else or clearing" the transaction."" In other words, the agent pretends
to execute the order in the open market, but instead simply "books" it. A
variation on this practice is where the order reaches the marketplace but is
not offered competitively, such as where the transaction is privately con-
cluded." The customer has a "rightful expectation" that his order will be
transmitted to the marketplace for competitive execution at the best possible
price. 12 The remainder of subsection (D) describes other forms of noncom-
petitive handling of principals' orders: (1) where the agent simply matches or
"crosses" orders in his possession between buying principals and selling prin-
cipals, and (2) where the agent, without the principal's prior consent, willfully
and knowingly "takes the other side" of the principal's orders. In each in-
stance, the agent deliberately handles the order in a noncompetitive way that
is different from the principal's understanding and expectation. None of the
forms of conduct described in subsection (D) can occur through mere negli-
gence; each is an intentional, deliberate course of action by the agent.
To summarize, the plain meaning of the words in each subsection of sec-
tion 4h require intentional, deliberate conduct by the agent. This plain mean-
ing should be given effect in cases brought under section 4b so that liability
will not be imposed under the section in the absence of proof of scienter.
Correspondingly, the CFTC position that negligence alone constitutes section
4b fraud should be abandoned.
2. Congressional Intent
The second step taken by the Hochfelder Court in construing section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act was to review the legislative history. This re-
view was conducted to ascertain whether it was the "intent" of Congress to
include unintentional, negligent conduct within that section. The Supreme
Court, concluded that Congress had revealed no such intent, but rather, as the
text of section 10(b) suggested, meant to reach only intentional acts of
fraud."
Section 4b of the Commodity Exchange Act was added to the original
statute in 1936 04 and has remained unchanged since that date. The Report of
the House Agriculture Committee "5 spoke of section 4b in terms of morally
reprehensible conduct. It observed that "Ws to those provisions of the bill
" All commodity futures transactions are "cleared" on the day of execution by
the contract market or an appointed clearing agency. Clearing consists of matching the
trade with the records of the opposite party and, thereafter, paying or collecting each
day an amount equal to the change in market price.
60 HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING, 86-87 (1971).
" 1 CFTC Reg. § 1.38, 17 C.F.R. § 1.38 (1978).
02
 Nichols & Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture, 136 F.2d 503 (1st Cir. 1943). But
where the principal knows of and consents to a non-competitive or "bucketed" trade,
he may be barred from invoking subsection (D). Garnac Grain Co., Inc., 8 A.D. 224
(1949).
" 425 U.S. at 201-06.
"4 Pub. L. 675, 79 Stat. 1943 (June 15, 1936).
" H.R. REP. No. 421, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (March 18, 1935).
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which impose penalties for cheating and sharp practices there can be no objec-
tion except from those who desire freedom from all restraint in these mat-
ters." 66 The nexus of "fraud" throughout section 4b was also acknowledged:
Section 4b makes it unlawful for members of contract markets,
and correspondents, agents, and employees thereof, in connection
with orders to make or the making of contracts of sale of any com-
modity in interstate commerce to cheat., defraud or deceive the cus-
tomer, or to bucket the order. The section also prohibits such fraudu-
lent practices in futures contracts in connection with orders made on
or subject to the rules of any contract market."'
During the floor debates on the 1936 amendments in the Senate, a proposal
was made to exempt cotton futures from one prohibition of section 4b and, in
that context, Senator Robinson characterized his view of section 4b as not to
penalize an honest transaction but to give the fullest possible freedom to any
fair business transaction, and at. the same time do everything that is reasona-
ble and necessary to prevent the crooks that sometimes operate on the market
from influencing it."""
In sum, a review of the 1936 legislative history discloses no intent of
Congress to equate mere negligence with the "cheating" and "fraud" that
Congress consistently explained as the target of section 4b. This assessment of
Congressional intent is buttressed as well by the fact that, in the same 1936
amendments, Congress made it. a crime to violate section 4b, punishable by a
$10,000 fine and one year imprisonment."" In 1974, the criminal fine for
violation of section 4b was increased ten-fold to $100,000," and in 1978 a
"knowing" violation of section 4b was made a felony punishable by up to a
$500,00() fine and five years imprisonment. 7 ' These harsh criminal penalties
would seem inappropriate and quite excessive if mere negligence constitutes a
section 4b fraud.
In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court also examined sections of the Securities
Exchange Act other than section 10(b) to determine whether Congress in-
tended to require scienter under section 10(b). 72 Under the Commodity Ex-
change Act., as amended in 1974, a second anti-fraud section was adopted—
section 40 73 — applicable to commodity trading advisors and commodity pool
operators. In pertinent part, section 40 bears an unmistakable similarity to
section 10(b) and SEC rule 10b-5:
fi" Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
07 Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
" CONG. Rec., 57845, 7872 (May 25, 1936) (emphasis added).
"" Pub. L. 675, 49 Stat. 1491, 1501 (1936).
7° Pub. L. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389, amending 7 U.S.C.
	 13.
" Pub. L. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865, amending 7 U.S.C. § 13. Use of the term
"knowingly" is a requirement for felony conviction in addition to proof of "willfulness."
Note that., in section 4b(D), both terms are used in conjunction with respect to the
"crossing" of orders. Thus, the new "knowingly" language does not infer that innocent
error or negligence would otherwise suffice, since "willfulness" remains to be proven.
72 425 U.S. at 206-11.
73 7 U.S.C. § 60 (1976).
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(1) It shall be unlawful for any commodity trading advisor or
commodity pool operator, by use of the mails or any means or in-
strumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly—
(A) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud
any client or participant or prospective client or participant; or
(B) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of bus-
iness which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or
participant or prospective client or participant."
The similarity between section 40 and rule 10b-5 strongly suggests a con-
gressional intent in section 40 to apply securities fraud concepts to the con-
duct of commodity trading advisors and commodity pool operators. Under
the 71 ochfelder analysis, if negligence alone is not "fraud" on the part of com-
modity trading advisors or commodity pool operators under section 40 of the
Commodity Exchange Act, it would seem incongruous for negligence to be
"fraud" when other fiduciaries under the Act are involved, unless a clear con-
gressional intent to make such a distinction exists. It does not.
III.  POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Having concluded that neither the language of section 4b nor its legisla-
tive history encourage, let alone compel, the equating of negligence with
fraud, it remains to be determined whether Hochfelder should be bypassed
because of public policy reasons applicable to commodities regulation that do
not apply to the securities markets. In part, the answer resides in the relative
potential for fraud in the two industries.
There can be no doubt that commodity futures trading involves a high
degree of risk. Indeed, it has been stated that "[disk is synonymous with
commodity futures trading." 75 That risk, however, inheres primarily in the
leverage available to commodity traders due to low margin requirements that
are frequently less than ten percent of the contract value. Market price
movements, although volatile at times, are not likely to be greater on a per-
centage basis than some active equity securities. The price of soybean futures
contracts, for example, underwent a 400 percent increase in price during
1973, an extremely dramatic price movement by commodity futures stan-
dards. By contrast, many equity securities experience price movements of that
magnitude each year. In any event, risk, even leveraged risk, is not "fraud",
nor is it created by fraud. Rather, the risk emanates from the ebb .and flow of
free market forces."
The potential for fraud is often greater in securities transactions than in
commodity trading. Each issue of equity securities is unique in some respects,
74 Id.
as Gordon v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 2 CCH Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 11
20,427 (June 14, 1977) (initial decision).
76
 Tampering with free market forces—manipulation—is a violation of the
Commodity Exchange Act separate from the anti-fraud provision of section 4b. See sec-
tions 6(b) and 9 of the Act, 15 U.S.G. §§ 9, 13.
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so that the prospective investor must receive or review different information
for each investment decision. Commonly, that information comes initially
from the issuer who is eager to distribute the security, or from the underwrit-
ers or broker/dealers who profit from speedy distribution or sale. Clearly the
risk of material misstatements or omissions is great in such an environment,
and the reliance of the potential investor upon that information is nearly ab-
solute. In sharp contrast, commodity trading involves a relatively limited
number of standardized contracts written by the impartial commodity ex-
changes, approved in every material detail by the Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission, and codified in published rulebooks.
Another possible area of fraud is in misrepresenting the value of a poten-
tial investment. Here, once again, the problem is far more acute in securities
than in commodities. While securities prices are governed solely by the collec-
tive judgment of securities traders, the value of commodities is dependent
ultimately on the prices paid outside the futures market by merchants, proces-
sors or exporters of the commodities themselves. Thus, whether a particular
security is "over-priced" or a "bargain" is purely a matter of opinion among
similarly situated investors, while the price of commodity futures can be read-
ily compared with "cash" market transactions. The ability to misrepresent the
true worth of a futures contract, therefore, is highly restricted.
Fraud can also surface when an investor needs information necessary to
judge an investment's future prospects. In securities, for example, investors
make purchasing or selling decisions on the basis of the issuer's expected fu-
ture growth and profitability, and they need accurate information about the
issuer's products, markets, management skills, and other characteristics to
make those decisions. Misrepresentation is both possible and highly injurious
in those circumstances. For commodity trading, however, future prospects
depend largely upon supply, demand, weather, and other factors that are
widely published (often from government sources) and that do not originate
with directly interested persons.
The potential for fraud can also be related to the size or sophistication of.
existing or potential investors. By that test, securities investors require greater
protection than commodity traders. First, the number of securities investors is
estimated at approximately 20-25 million while the number of commodity
traders is probably below 200,000. Second, the composition of commodity
traders, at least on the largest exchange, consists roughly of seventy-five per-
cent commercial or professional traders and only about twenty-five percent
avocational public investors. Third, the typical commodity trader is likely to be
fairly sophisticated and affluent. As the Chairman of the House Agriculture
Committee observed in 1973, "While securities markets attract the small
speculator, with' a limited exposure to loss, futures speculation is normally
limited to the more venturesome and solvent speculator.""
As a general rule, therefore, it would seem that the opportunities for
fraud, deceit and cheating may well be more plentiful in securities than in
commodities simply due to differences in their inherent nature. Accordingly,
77 119 CoNc. REC. H41, 335 (1973).
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there seems to be no identifiable feature of commodity trading that compels a
definition of "fraud" more expansive than in the regulation of securities.
CONCLUSION
While opinions may vary on the wisdom of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, it
is nevertheless the controlling law with respect to securities fraud under sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. This article has examined whether
the Hochfelder analysis would support a "scienter" requirement under section
4b of the Commodity Exchange Act. Because the words used in section 4b
seem tailored to intentional or deliberate misconduct, because the Congress
seems to have adopted section 4b to get the "crooks" in the industry, and
because the potential for victimization through fraud seems no greater, and
perhaps less, in commodity trading than in securities, section 4b should prop-
erly be interpreted as requiring scienter. To blur the traditional and common
sense distinction between fraud and negligence would simply remove the in-
tended sting of a fraud finding or unfairly equate human carelessness with
dishonesty. Neither result seems to constitute a proper "remedial purpose" of
the Commodity Exchange Act. Moreover, abundant remedies for merely neg-
ligent conduct will still exist for injured investors at common law.
